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THE ROLE OF ERROR IN ORGANIZING BEHAVIOUR1
Jens Rasmussen
Risø National Laboratory
Dk 4000, Roskilde Denmark
Introduction
During recent  years, the significance of the concept of human error has changed consider-
ably. The reason for this has partly been an increasing interest of psychological research
in analysis of complex real-life phenomena, partly the changes of modern work conditions
caused by  advanced information technology. Consequently, the topic of the present
contribution will not be a definition of the concept or a proper taxonomy. Instead, a
review will be given of a couple of professional contexts for which the concept of error is
important.Three cases of analysis of human-system interaction will be reviewed: 1.
Traditional task analysis and human reliability estimation; 2. Causal analysis of accidents
after the fact and finally, 3. Design of reliable work conditions in modern socio-technical
systems. It is concluded that 'errors' cannot be studied as a separate category of behaviour
fragments; the object of study should be cognitive control of behaviour  in complex
environments.
1. Traditional task analysis and human reliability estimation.
Human activity in traditional work environments can be described in terms of repetitive
tasks, i.e., sequences of acts in control of some equipment or tool. Manufacturing systems
were normally planned for effective and economic operation during long periods of time.
Planned or normal work sequences had time to settle in stable patterns which  could be
identified during design by analysis of the task to control tools and equipment or
afterwards by field studies. Since successful operation during production or in a particular
mission was of fundamental interest, technical and human reliability analysis became
important design tools both for military and high hazard industrial operations.
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Figure 1 illustrates the human involvement in a causal sequence of events. The event of human error is de-
composed to identify the cognitive task element and the psychological mechanism involved in the error. At
this level of detail, an event in the work context activates a particular psychological mechanism which influ-
ences the immediate decision task required by the work.  A decision error in turn, introduces an error in the
overt action sequence with unacceptable consequences for the work goal. Two aspects are essential in the
present context. One is that human 'error' very frequently will be a link in a sequence, not the origin.
Secondly 'errors' can be categorized at different stages in the flow. This representation is well suited for
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Failure-Mode-And-Effect analysis in the interface of technical systems: The various psychological 'error
mechanisms' are folded onto the cognitive task from which the effects, in turn, are folded onto functional
system properties for evaluation of the consequences.
In this situation, human errors can easily be defined; normative sequences of proper acts
are available for reference and errors can readily be identified and recorded. As long as
analysis is concerned with familiar, repetitive tasks, errors caused by lack of resources or
proper intention are  of minor importance and errors can be studied in terms of their overt
effects (Swain's Therp method, Swain and Guttmann, 1983). In modern work places
people are frequently moved to supervisory tasks and decision making and, consequently,
reliability analysis will be focused on less well-structured and stable tasks involving
diagnosis and contingency planning. Focus of error analysis is moved back from overt
acts to decision functions and further on to psychological mechanisms (see figure 1). It is
a remarkable fact that given a particular sequence of human acts, taxonomies of error
analysis resulting  from detailed analysis of actual cases of incidents and accidents and
from psychological laboratory research show definitive convergent properties
(Rasmussen, 1988a). When a particular task sequence can be taken as reference (i.e., a
sequence which is functionally constrained by the equipment to operate or firmly
established by training) a failure-mode-and-effect analysis is a very feasible approach to
identify the hazards presented by human error. It will be effective during design to ensure
error tolerance even if quantitative reliability prediction may not be realistic (Rasmussen,
1982).
A necessary precondition is, however, that the sequence in which the 'error' is analyzed
can be taken for granted. This is the case only when we are involved in a local  analysis
focused on  the immediate human-machine interface: We then try to predict the risk
involved in the operation of some particular technological system of a known design. The
acceptable work procedure is identified from the functional requirements of equipment,
given a definite goal. This is, as mentioned, a reasonable assumption if the task is
repetitive as it was the normal case in established technology. In addition, we are dealing
with a human link in an extended chain of events; the 'error' is a link in the chain, in most
cases not the origin of the course of events. This kind of analysis and consequently,
definition of error is completely inadequate when we are dealing with design or
improvement of large-scale socio-technical systems. In general, we do not have a simple
causal trace deflected from its intended course toward one goal. Actually, such a separate
trace is the manifestation of a particular, dynamic flow of events in a complex network
involving several goals and side effects and many side branches. Previous flows of events
along these branches have served to precondition the river bed in which the dynamic flow
is taking place.
2. Causal analysis of accidents after the fact.
In this case, we are analyzing a chain of events up-stream from an accident in order to un-
derstand,  why  it happened; to find somebody to blame, who done it; or find out how to
improve the system. We are trying to describe a particular course of events and to identify
the particular causal trace in which human error is embedded.
Accidents are normally analyzed in terms of accidental chains of events, i.e., causal repre-
sentations. Since no two accidents will be identical, accident analysis will depend on
prototypical categories of causes, events, and consequences. Representation of the
behaviour of the physical world in causal terms is very effective for describing accidents
because the objects of the real world are explicit in the model and their changes are easily
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modelled which is not the case in a model based on relations among quantitative variables.
It is, however, important to consider the implicit frame of reference of a causal analysis
(Rasmussen, 1988b).
The behaviour of the complex, real world is a continuous, dynamic flow which can only
be explained in causal terms after decomposition into discrete events. The concept of a
causal interaction of events and objects depends on a categorisation of human
observations and experiences. Perception of occurrences as events in causal connection
does not depend on categories which are defined by lists of objective attributes but on
categories which are identified by typical examples, i.e., prototypes (as defined by Rosch,
1975). This is the case for objects as well as for events. Everybody knows perfectly well
what 'a cup' is. To define it objectively by a list of attributes that separates cups from jars,
vases and bowls is no trivial problem.  It has for instance, been met in many attempts to
design computer programs for picture analysis.   The basic problem is that the property to
be 'a cup' is not a feature of an isolated object but depends on the context of human needs
and experience. The identification of events in the same way depends on the relationship
in which they appear in a causal statement. An objective definition, therefore, will be
circular.
In the analysis of accidents, decomposition of the dynamic flow of changes will normally
terminate when a sequence is found including events which match the prototypes familiar
to the analyst.  The resulting explanation will take for granted his frame of reference and
in general, only what he finds to be unusual will be included: the less familiar the context,
the more detailed the decomposition. By means of the analysis, a causal path is found up-
stream from the accidental effect. This path will be prepared by resident conditions which
are latent effects of earlier events or acts. Also these resident conditions can be explained
by causal back-tracking and in this case branches in the path are found. To explain the
accident, these branches are also traced backward until all conditions are explained by
abnormal, but familiar events or acts. The point is: how do the degree of decomposition of
the causal explanation and selection of the side-branches depend on the circumstances of
the analysis? Another question is: What is the stop-rule applied for termination of the
search for causes? Ambiguous and implicit stop rules will make the results of analysis
very sensitive to the topics discussed in the professional community at any given time.
There is a tendency to see what you expect; during one period, technical faults were in
focus as causes of accidents, then human errors predominated while in the future focus
will probably move up-stream to designers and managers. This points to the question
whether system break-down is related to higher level functional structures and feedback
mechanisms rather than to the local conditions of events. In that case, traditional causal
attribution turn out to be fighting symptoms rather than the origin of break-down.
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Figure 2 illustrates a causal explanation of a driving accident. The flow of behaviour is decomposed into
chains of events. Note that only abnormal or unusual events together with violations of rules are included.
The normal activities conditioning the path are not included. Furthermore, decomposition and causal back-
tracking stop at events which are taken to be 'reasonable explanations.'
(Adopted from Leplat & Rasmussen, 1987).
The perception of stop-rules is very important in the control of causal explanations.
Everyone from college knows the relief felt when finding a list of solutions to math prob-
lems. Not that it gave the path to solution to any great extent, but it gave a clear stop-rule
for the search for possible mistakes, overseen preconditions, and calculation errors. The
result: hours saved and peace of mind. A more professional example to the same point is
given by Kuhn (1976). He mentions the fact that chemical research only was able to come
up with whole-number relations between elements of chemical substances after the
acceptance of John Dalton's chemical atom theory. There had been no stop rule for the
efforts in refinement of the experimental technique until the acceptance of this theory.
Stop-rules are not usually formulated explicitly. The search will typically be terminated
pragmatically in one of the following ways: (a) An event will be accepted as a cause and
the search terminated if the causal path can no longer be followed because information is
missing; (b) A familiar, abnormal event is found to be a reasonable explanation; or (c) A
cure is available. The dependence of the stop rule upon familiarity and the availability of a
cure makes the judgement very dependent upon the role in which a judge finds himself.
An operator, a supervisor, a designer, and a legal judge will reach different conclusions.
To summarize: identification of accident causes is controlled by pragmatic, subjective
stop-rules. These rules depend on the aim of the analysis, i.e., whether the aim is to
explain the course of events, to allocate responsibility and blame, or to identify possible
system improvements in order to avoid future accidents.
Analysis for Explanation. In an analysis to explain an accident, the backtracking will be
continued until a cause is found which is familiar to the analysts. If a technical component
fails, a component fault will only be accepted as the prime cause if the failure of the
particular type of component appears to be 'as usual.' Further search will probably be
made, if the consequences of the fault make the designer's choice of component quality
unreasonable, or if a reasonable operator could have terminated the effect, had he been
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more alert or been better trained. In such a case, a design or manufacturing error,
respectively an operator error will be accepted for explanation.
In most recent reviews of larger industrial accidents, it has been found that human errors
are playing an important role in the course of events. Frequently, errors are attributed to
operators involved in the dynamic flow of events. This can be an effect of the very nature
of the causal explanation. Human error is, particularly at present, familiar to an analyst: to
err is human, and highly skilled people will frequently depart from normative procedures
as we will see in a subsequent section.
Analysis for Allocation of Responsibility.   In order to allocate responsibility, the stop-rule
of the backward tracing of events will be  to identify a person who made an error and at
the same time, 'was in power of control' of his acts. The very nature of the causal
explanation will focus attention on people directly and dynamically involved in the flow
of abnormal events.  This is unfortunate because they can very well be in a situation where
they do not have the 'power of control.' Traditionally, a person is not considered in power
of control when physically forced by another person or when subject to disorders such as
e.g., epileptic attacks. In such cases, acts are involuntary (Fitzgerald, 1961; Feinberg,
1965), from a judgement based on physical or physiological factors. It is, however, a
question as to whether cognitive, psychological factors should also be taken more into
account when judging 'power of control.' Inadequate response of operators to unfamiliar
events depends very much on the conditioning taking place during normal work. This
problem also raises the question of the nature of human error. The behaviour of operators
is conditioned by the conscious decisions made by work planners or managers. They will
very likely be more 'in power of control' than an operator in the dynamic flow of events.
However, their  decisions may not be considered during a causal analysis after an accident
because they are 'normal events' which are not usually represented in an accident analysis.
Furthermore, they can be missed in analysis because they are to be found in a conditioning
side branch of the causal tree, not in the path involved in the dynamic flow.
Present technological development toward high hazard systems requires a very careful
consideration by designers of the effects of 'human errors' which are commonplace in
normal, daily activities, but unacceptable in large-scale systems. There is considerable
danger that systematic traps can be arranged for people in the dynamic course of events.
The present concept of 'power of control' should be reconsidered from a cognitive point of
view, as should the ambiguity of stop-rules in causal analysis to avoid unfair causal
attribution to the people involved in the dynamic chain of events.
Analysis for System Improvements. Analysis for therapeutic purpose, i.e., for system im-
provement, will require a different focus with respect to selection of the causal network
and of the stop-rule. The stop-rule will now be related to the question of whether an
effective cure is known. Frequently, cure will be associated with events perceived to be
'root causes'. In general, however, the effects of accidental courses of events can be
avoided by breaking or blocking any link in the causal tree or its conditioning side
branches. Explanatory descriptions of accidents are, as mentioned,  focused on the unusual
events. However, the path can also be broken by changing normal events and functions
involved. The decomposition of the flow of events, therefore, should not focus on unusual
events, but also include normal activities.
The aim is to find conditions sensitive to improvements. Improvements imply that some
person in the system makes decisions differently in the future. How do we systematically
identify persons and decisions in a (normal) situation when it would be psychologically
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feasible to ask for a change in behaviour as long as reports from accidents focus only on
the flow of unusual events? An approach to such an analysis for improving work safety
has been discussed elsewhere (Leplat and Rasmussen, 1984).
In conclusion, the choice of stop-rules for the analysis of accidents is normally left to the
subjective judgement of the analyst, depending heavily on the aim of his analysis.
Analyses made for one purpose may, therefore, be misleading for other purposes.
3. Design of reliable work conditions and socio-technical systems
Modern Work Conditions. A number of problems are met when attempts are made to
improve safety of socio-technical systems from analyses tied to particular  paths of
accidental events. This is due to the fact that each path is a particular token shaped by
higher order relational structures. If changes are introduced to remove the conditions of a
particular link in the chain, odds are that this particular situation will never occur again.
We should be fighting types, not individual tokens. Human behaviour is constrained in a
way that makes the chain of events reasonably predictable only in the immediate interface
to the technical systems. The longer away from the technical core we are, the more
degrees of freedom agents have in their mode of behaviour. Consequently, the less certain
is also the reference in terms of normal or proper behaviour for judging 'errors'. This
problem is becoming increasingly important as the modern manufacturing systems and
organizations are forced to become highly flexible in order to be able to respond to
increasingly dynamic market requirements, technological innovations, and legal
constraints.
In this situation, improvements of safety features of a socio-technical system depend on a
global analysis: No longer can we assume the trace of human behaviour to be predictable.
Tasks will be formed for the occasion, and design for improvements must be based on at-
tempts to find means of control at higher levels than the level of particular task
procedures. If, for instance, socio-technical systems have features of adaptation and self-
organization, changes to improve safety at the individual task level can very well be
compared to attempts to control the temperature in a room with a thermostat-controlled
heater by opening the window. In other words, it is not sensible to try to change
performance of a feedback system by changes inside the loop, you have to identify
mechanisms that are sensitive, i.e., related to the control reference itself.
Such basic, high level features of "human error" in flexible socio-technical system are re-
lated to the dependence of human performance on features such as 1. Learning and
adaptation, 2. Conflicts among cognitive control structures, 3. Resource limitations and
finally, 4. Stochastic variability. An attempt to develop guidelines for design of human-
work interfaces from such higher level features has been presented elsewhere (Rasmussen
and Vicente, 1987).
Human adaptation. In all work situations constraints are found which must be respected
to perform satisfactorily. There are, however, also many degrees of freedom which have to
be resolved at the worker's discretion. In stable work conditions, know-how will develop
which represents prior decisions and choice and the perceived degrees of freedom will
ultimately be very limited, i.e., 'normal ways' of doing things will emerge, and the process
of adaptation will no longer be messing-up the concept of error. In contrast, in modern,
flexible and dynamic work conditions, the immediate degrees of freedom will have to be
continuously resolved. This implies that effective work performance includes continuous
awareness of the available degrees of freedom together with effective strategies for
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making choice, ahead of the task of controlling the chosen path to a goal. This changes the
concept of error in a very fundamental way.
The behaviour in work of individuals (and, consequently, also of organizations) is, by def-
inition, oriented towards the requirements of the work environment as perceived by the
individual. Work requirements, what should be done, will normally be perceived in terms
of control of the state of affairs in the work environment according to a goal, i.e., why it
should be done. How these changes are made to a certain degree is a matter of discretion
of the agent.
The alternative, acceptable work activities,  how to work, will be shaped by the work
environment which defines the boundaries of the space of possibilities, i.e., acceptable
work strategies. This space of possibilities will be further bounded by the resource profile
of the particular agent in terms of tools available, knowledge (competence), information
about state of affairs, and processing capacity. The presence of alternatives for action
depends on a many-to-many mapping between means and ends present in the work
situation as perceived by the individual; in general, several functions can serve the
individual goals and each of the functions can be implemented by different tools and
physical processes. If this was not the case, the work environment would be totally
predetermined and there would be no need for human choice or decision.
Boundary of Individual  
Resource Profile
Boundary of Available 
Means of Work 
Boundary of Acceptable 
State of Affairs
Space of Possibilities; Degrees of 
Freedom to be Resolved According 
to Subjective Preferences
Figure 3. Human behaviour is governed by
constraints which must be respected by the
actors for work performance to be successful.
Identification of such constraints will specify
the 'space' in which the human can navigate
freely. Violation of the constraints will be
considered human error or task violation in
the usual sense. For successful performance,
humans have to navigate between several
boundaries. One is given by the control
requirements posed by the system, another by
the means offered for work. et another
boundary is given by the human resource
profile which depend on individual
characteristics such as competence, mental
capacity, physical strength, etc. Navigation
within the envelope specified by these
boundaries will depend on subjective criteria
for choice, such as aim to save time, to spare
memory load, to have fun, to explore new
land, etc.
Within the space of acceptable work performance between the boundaries defined by the
work requirements on one side and the individual resource profile on the other side,
considerable degrees of freedom are still left for the individual to choose among strategies
and to implement them in particular sequences of behaviour. These degrees of freedom
must be eliminated by the choice of an agent to finally enter a particular course of action.
The different ways to accomplish work can be categorized in terms of strategies, defined
as types of behavioural sequences which are similar in some well defined aspects, such as
the physical process applied in work and the related tools or, for mental strategies, the
underlying kind of mental representation and the level of interpretation of perceived
information. In actual performance, a particular situation-dependent exemplar of
performance, a token will emerge which is an implementation of the chosen strategy under
the influence of the complexity of detail in the environment. The particular token of
performance will be unique, impossible to predict, whereas the strategy chosen  will, in
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principle, be predictable. This choice made by the individual agents depends on subjective
performance criteria related to the process of work such as time spent, cognitive strain,
joy, cost of failure, etc. In general the freedom to chose work strategy and to shift
dynamically between strategies is very important as a means to resolve resource-demand
conflicts met during performance.
Figure 4. An Example: The activities involved in
going to work. The work given constraints are
related to the location, the time of arrival, and
the probability of delays. Constraints in means
are defined by the transport alternatives, i.e., to
take the tube, a taxi, or to drive by yourself. The
subjective process criterion determining your
choice depend on economy, your wife´s request
to bring some grocery and maybe, consideration
of the time spent, the likelihood of traffic jams.
Given the decision to drive by yourself, the
choice of route depends on the secondary task of
shopping, of your joy with a particular scenery,
and the traffic density. Finally, en route, the
speed you choose depend on traffic given
constraints, on formal conditions such as speed
limits or your wife´s anxiety, and ultimately
sporty criteria related to  your driving skill, i.e.,
to drive fast and smoothly
Goals and Values, 
Constraints
General Functions  
Physical Processes 
in Work and 
Equipment
Priority Measures, 
Flow of money, ma- 
terial, Information
Work, Income, Intellectual and 
Esthetic Pleasure;  
Social Family Relations
Work Function: Transport
Train, Taxi, Private Car 
Routes, Distances, Scenery; 
Shops and Locations, etc.
Train Operation, Schedules, Space for 
Reading; Taxi: Time Spent, Traffic  
Jams, Price; Car: Traffic, Time, Price
Family  Function: Shopping
Expenses, Joy, probability of 
Success and Delays
Means-Ends Relations
Material Objects, 
Tools, Buildings, etc. 
Topography
Cognitive Strain
Time spent
Basic Knowledge
Prior Experience
Resource Requirements 
of Diagnostic Strategies
Search
Functional Reasoning
Figure 5. The figure serves to
illustrate the different
resource requirements of
different mental strategies.
This difference makes a shift
in strategy when faced with
difficulties in a task, an
effective way to navigate
along the path of least effort,
a very popular  strategy in
skilled performance to adapt
behaviour to immediate work
situation.
Modelling work activity from this point of view  depends on identification of the space of
acceptable and possible work strategies (i.e., prototypical sets of behaviour sequences),
the human resource profile, and the subjective criteria governing the resolution of the
remaining degrees of freedom in different work scenarios. Some work requirements are
explicit and discrete with specified limits of acceptance. Other requirements are
formulated as optimising criteria serving to resolve ambiguity in goal specification, such
as the request to reach a solution which is as cheap or as safe as possible. Such product
criteria, together with the subjective process criteria, necessarily will lead to an adaptive
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behaviour seeking to optimise performance according with the criteria along with
evolution of training and expertise.
Adaptation, Self-organization and Error.  It follows directly from this discussion that
structuring the work processes through on-the-job training  by an individual will be a self-
organizing, evolutionary process, simply because an optimising  search is the only way in
which the large number of degrees of freedom in a complex situation can be resolved. The
basic synchronization to the work requirements can based on procedures learned from an
instructor or a more experienced colleague or it can be planned by the individual on oc-
casion in a knowledge-based mode of reasoning by means of mental experiments. From
here, the smoothness and speed characterizing high professional skill  together with a
large repertoire of heuristic know-how rules will evolve through an adaptation process in
which 'errors' are unavoidable side effects of the exploration of the boundaries of the
envelope of acceptable performance. During this adaptation, performance will be
optimised according to the individual's subjective process criteria within the boundary of
his individual resources. This complex adaptation of performance to work requirements,
eliminating the necessity of continuous choice will result in stereotype practices
depending on the individual performance criteria of the agents. These criteria will be
significantly influenced by the social norms and culture of the group and organization.
Very likely, conflict will be found between global work goals and the effect of local
adaptation according to subjective process criteria. Unfortunately, the perception of
process quality can be immediate and unconditional while the effect on product quality of
the choice of an actor can be considerably delayed, obscure and frequently conditional
with respect to multiple other factors.
In a first encounter, when representation of work constraints is not present in the form of
instructions from an experienced colleague or a teacher, and know-how from previous ex-
periences is not ready, the constraints of the work have to be explored in a knowledge-
based mode from explicit consideration of the actual goal and a functional understanding
of the relational structure of the work content. For such initial exploration as well as for
problem solving during unusual task conditions, opportunity for test of hypotheses and
trial-and-error learning is important. It is typically expected that qualified personnel such
as process operators will and can test their diagnostic hypotheses conceptually - by
thought experiments - before actual operations if acts are likely to be irreversible and
risky.  This appears, however, to be an unrealistic assumption, since it may be tempting to
test a hypothesis on the physical work environment itself in order to avoid the strain and
unreliability related to unsupported reasoning in a complex causal net. For such a task, a
designer is supplied with effective tools such as experimental set-ups, simulation
programs and computational aids, whereas the operator has only his head and the plant
itself. In the actual situation, no explicit stop rule exists to guide the termination of
conceptual analysis and the start of action. This means that the definition of error, as seen
from the situation of a decision maker, is very arbitrary. Acts which are quite rational and
important during the search for information and test of hypothesis may appear to be
unacceptable mistakes in hindsight, without access to the details of the situation.
Even if a human actor is 'synchronized' to the basic requirements of work by effective
procedures, there will be amble opportunities for modification of such procedures.
Development of expert know-how and rules-of-thumb depends on adaptation governed by
subjective process criteria. Opportunities for experiments are necessary to find shortcuts
and to identify convenient and reliable cues for action without analytical diagnosis. In
other words, effective, professional performance depends on empirical correlation of cues
to successful acts. Humans typically seek the way of least effort. Therefore, experts will
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not consult the complete set of defining attributes in a familiar situation. Instead it can be
expected that no more information will be used than is necessary for discrimination
among the perceived alternatives for action in the particular situation. This implies that
the choice is 'under-specified' (Reason, 1986) outside this situation. When situations
change, e.g., due to disturbances or faults in the system to be controlled, reliance on the
usual cues which are no longer valid, will cause an error due to inappropriate
"expectations." In this way, traps causing systematic mistakes can be designed into the
system. Two types of errors are related to this kind of adaptation: The effect of the test of
a hypothesis of salient cues and action which turn out negative, and the effects of acts
chosen from familiar and tested cues when a change in system conditions make the
perceived set of alternatives unreliable.
Work according to instructions which take into consideration the possible presence of ab-
normal conditions that  will make certain orders of actions unacceptable presents an
example in which local adaptation is in conflict with delayed and conditional effect on the
outcome. The be safe, the instruction may require a certain sequence of the necessary acts.
If this prescribed order is in conflict with the actor's immediate process criteria,
modification of the prescribed procedure is very likely and will have no adverse effect in
the daily routine. (If, for instance, an actor has to move back and forth between several,
distant locations because only that sequence is safe under certain infrequent, risky
conditions, his process criterion may rapidly teach him to group actions at the same
location together because this change in the procedure will not have any visible effect
under normal circumstances).
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Figure 6 illustrates the complex interaction between the different levels of cognitive control. Tasks are fre-
quently analyzed in terms of sequences of separate acts. In general, however, control of several acts takes
place concurrent. Control of skilled sensorimotor activity is based on a continuous, dynamic interaction with
the environment. Attention, on the other hand, is scanning across time and activities in order to analyze past
performance, monitor current activity, and plan for  foreseen  future   requirements.  In this way, intuitive
expectation is being prepared for oncoming demands and related  cues and  rules are rehearsed and modified
to match predicted requirements. Symbolic reasoning is used to understand responses from the environment
and to prepare rules for foreseen but unfamiliar situations. Attention may not always be focused on current
activities, and different levels may simultaneously be involved in the control of different tasks, related to
different time slots, in a time sharing or in a parallel processing mode.
Even within an established, effective sequence of actions, evolution of patterns of move-
ments will take place according to subconscious perception of certain process qualities. In
a manual skill, fine-tuning depends upon a continuous updating of automated patterns of
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movement to the temporal and spatial features of the task environment. If the optimisation
criteria are speed and smoothness, adaptation can only be constrained by the once-in-a-
while experience gained when crossing the tolerance limits, i.e. by the experience of
errors or near-errors (speed-accuracy trade-off). Some errors, therefore, have a function in
maintaining a skill at its proper level, and they cannot be considered a separable category
of events in a causal chain because they are integral parts of a feed-back loop. Another
effect of increasing skill is the evolution  of increasingly long and complex  patterns of
movements which can run off without conscious control. During such lengthy automated
patterns attention is directed towards review of past experience or planning of future needs
(see figure 6) and performance is sensitive to interference, i.e., capture from very familiar
cues.
When delayed or conditional, global effects of behaviour are possible, error recovery by
feedback correction and control of the local adaptation is not possible, and adaptation will
be controlled by an evolutionary 'survival of the fittest' work process. In order to compete
effectively with the effect of the local process criteria, the perception of fitness of such
stored procedures must be maintained in another way (e.g., by artificial reinforcement or
preferably, by rearranging the environment to include the global requirements in the local
criteria). Otherwise, simple decay of memory of stored work rules (decay is, in effect,
necessary for adaptation to changing requirements from a work environment) will
necessarily require a repeated experience of the conflict, i.e., error, in order to maintain
proper adaptation to  characteristics of the environment.
The Structure of Cooperative work. So far, the discussion has been focused on the
individual adaptation of work strategies to task requirement. In general, however, several
people will be active in a work environment and also the adoption or allocation of the
roles of the individuals evolve in a self-organizing mode according to local criteria and
within the constraints of externally imposed allocation structures. Such constraints on the
evolutionary role definition can have their origin in work requirements as well as in
human resource limitations.
Role Allocation. Some constraints on work allocation originate in the work domain.
Actions can, for instance, be required simultaneously in separate locations; or work can
require competence which is depending on more than one profession. Such conditions will
limit the extent to which allocation can be dynamically adapted to the preference of the
involved individuals. In some cases, however, constraints are rather soft and will not be
respected strictly during adaptation (e.g., the boundaries between activities which have
been assigned members of different unions by labour market agreements). In other cases,
constraints are effectively reinforced, for instance when performance is governed by strict
quality control standards as is the case for manufacturing according to mill specs or in
financial operations with strict legal control. In most cases, however, boundaries among
the roles allocated the individual actors are continuously adjusted according to the
requirements of the immediate work situation.
As it was the case for the choice among alternative work strategies, the dynamic shifting
of boundaries between roles will be used to resolve resource demand conflicts and to
match performance to individual preferences. The subjective criteria active in this
adaptation will be very situation dependent and directly related to the particular work
process, such as perception of differences in work load among colleagues, the amount of
communication necessary among agents for coordination, subjective preferences for
certain activities, etc. This adaptation of role allocation and coordination to work
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requirements during the normal conditions will endanger the functions during exceptional
situations.
Coordination of cooperative work. For concerted work activity, the different processes
and functions of work within the various levels of the means-ends space of a work domain
will be allocated several individuals. Often, coordination will be allocated other
individuals than those taking care of the functions to be coordinated. This is the case in all
hierarchic organizations. In effect, boundaries are found between roles at different levels
in the hierarchical control structure, as well as among roles within the levels.
The basic structure of the allocation depends on the functional requirements of the work
content such as the topograhic location of work items, the work load related to certain
functions, the timing required between functions in different places, and the time frames
to consider in the coordination at the various levels. In other words, technology shapes
organization bottom-up by posing strict constraints on allocation of functions to groups
and individuals. In many domains, in particular in tightly coupled technical domains like
manufacturing, process control, etc. strict control and timing requirements can be
explicitly formulated from an analysis of the work requirements.
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Figure 7 illustrates the coordination of cooperative work. At the level of work, a dynamically changing allo-
cation to individuals is governed by criteria such as sharing load, minimizing communication, individual in-
terest, etc.  At the level of co-ordination, the content of communication necessary for concerted action is
specified by the work content and the actual role allocation. In this way, the work organization is dynami-
cally shaped bottom-up. Management practice and social values define rules of conduct,  i.e., the form of the
coordination and therefore, are shaping the social organization top-down. In addition, formal constraints
such as laws, regulations, and union agreements add constraints on allocation and coordination 'side-in'.
Within the boundaries defined in this way, there is plenty of room for adaptation guided by subjective
criteria. (Adopted from Rasmussen, 1988c).
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However, within the allocation and coordination constraints posed by the work content,
there are many degrees of freedom to arrange the role allocation and to structure the way,
coordination is brought about. Additional, formal constraints on allocation can originate
in legal requirements (authorization, etc.), agreements (union boundaries), regulations
(quality assurance standards) and rules of conduct (military).
System Reliability and Safety. The dynamic adaptation to the immediate work re-
quirements both of the individual performance and of the allocation between individuals
probably will be able to create a very high degree of reliability as long as the interaction is
transparent (i.e.; critical aspects are visible without excessive delay), and individual
process criteria are not in conflict with or are not overriding critical product criteria.
System break-down and accidents are the reflections of loss of control of the work envi-
ronment in some way or another. If the hypothesis is accepted that humans tend to close
their degrees of freedom to get rid of choice and decision during normal work and that er-
rors are a necessary part of this adaptation; the trick in design of reliable systems is to
make sure that human actors  maintain sufficient flexibility to cope with system
aberrations, i.e., not to constrain them by an inadequate rule system. In addition, it appears
to be essential that actors maintain 'contact' with hazards in a way that they will be
familiar with the boundary to loss of control and will learn to recover. In 'safe' system in
which the margins between normal operation and loss of control  are made as wide as
possible the odds are that the actors will not be able to sense the boundaries and,
frequently, the boundaries will then be more abrupt and irreversible. When radar was
introduced to increase safety at sea, the result was not increased safety but more efficient
transportation under bad weather conditions. Will anti-blocking car brakes increase safety
or give more efficient transport together with more abrupt and irreversible boundaries to
loss of control? A basic design question is: How can boundaries of acceptable
performance be established that will give feedback to a learning mode in a reversible way,
i.e., absorb violations in a mode of graceful degradation of the opportunity for recovery.
Under certain conditions, however, self-organizing and adaptive features will necessarily
lead to 'catastrophic' system behaviour unless certain organizational criteria are met.
Adaptation will normally be governed by local criteria, related to an individual's
perception of process qualities in order to resolve the perceived degrees of freedom in the
immediate situation. Some critical product criteria (e.g., safety) are conditionally related
to higher level combination or coincidence of effects of several activities, allocated
different agents and probably, in different time slots. The violation of such high level,
conditional criteria cannot be monitored and detected at the local criterion level, and
monitoring by their ultimate criterion effect will be too late and unacceptable.
Catastrophic effects of adaptation can only be avoided if local activities are tightly
monitored with reference to a prediction of their role in the ultimate, conditional effect,
i.e., the boundaries at the local activities are necessarily defined by formal prescriptions,
not active, functional conditions.
This feature of adaptation to local work requirements probably constitutes the fallacy of
the defence-in-depth design principle normally applied in high risk industries (Rasmussen,
1988d). In systems designed according to this principle, an accident is dependent on
simultaneous violation of several lines of defence: an operational disturbance (technical
fault or operator error) must coincide with a latent faulty maintenance condition in
protective systems, with inadequacies in protective barriers, with inadequate control of the
location of people close to the installation etc. The activities threatening the various
conditions normally belong to different branches of the organization. The presence of
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potential of a catastrophic combination of effects of local adaptation to performance
criteria can only be detected at a level in the organization with the proper overview.
However, at this level of the control hierarchy (organization), the required understanding
of conditionally dangerous relations cannot be maintained through longer periods because
the required functional and technical knowledge is foreign to the normal management
tasks at this level.
The conclusion of this discussion is that catastrophic system breakdown is a normal
feature of systems which have self-organizing features and at the same time, depend on
protection against rare combination of conditions which are individually affected by
adaptation. Safety of such systems depend on the introduction of locally visible
boundaries of acceptable adaptation and introduction of related control mechanisms. What
does this mean in terms of organizational structures? What kind of top-down influence
from 'management culture' and bottom-up technological constraints can be used to guide
and limit adaptation? How can we model and predict evolution of organizational structure
and the influence on system safety?
Conclusion
The conclusion of this discussion is that work in modern high-tech societies calls for a re-
consideration of the notion of human error and research should be focused on
understanding human behaviour and social interaction in general in cognitive terms in
complex, dynamic environments, not on fragments of behaviour  called error. The
approach has similarities to the risk homeostasis theories of traffic safety with the
reservation that the controlling mechanism is adaptation in a wider functional sense than
control governed by criteria related to risk only. An important consequence of the general
adaptivity of human behaviour and the relationship of errors to exploration of boundaries
during adaptation is that the success of high-hazard/low-risk design principles like
'defence-in-depth' depends on precautions taken to operate the systems according to the
basic assumptions behind the design philosophy. Such precautions in turn depend on the
use of risk management based on predictive risk analysis (Rasmussen, 1988d).
The arguments presented should not be taken to be arguments against causal post accident
analysis, predictive risk analysis, or the defence-in-depth design principle per se. On the
contrary, these methods are indispensable tools in control of industrial safety. The point to
consider carefully in the present rapid trend toward very large, tightly coupled systems is
that we are faced with new requirements for the use of these tools, as it was argued above
for the use of predictive risk analysis to operate 'defence-in-depth systems' according to
their basic assumptions. Another example: A causal analysis of an accident can supply a
very acceptable record of the course of events; it is a valuable set of data. Such a record,
however, is not a model of the system, it does not represent the internal coupling among
the local states in the system conditioning the flow of events. To predict the effect of
improvements another analysis is necessary to identify the functional requirements and
external pressures which are in fact, controlling the adaptation leading to the new
operational state of affairs following the 'improvement.' This kind of analysis is, at
present, a research topic. An operations or management error is not necessarily a human
error which should be blamed on an operator or manager, but depends on a deeper
structural property which makes operators and managers adapt to a particular type of
behaviour. How can this deeper structure be identified?
The basic issue is that tightly coupled, large-scale systems require much closer
coordination of the development of the various tools used for design, operation, risk
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management, and regulatory measures than was necessary in the past and is present
practice.
The basic issue is that tightly coupled, large-scale systems require much closer
coordination of the development of the various tools used for design, operation, risk
management, and regulatory measures than was necessary in the past and is present
practice.
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